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Prospects for Peace and Democracy: Power-Sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa
Abstract
Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most politically unstable and undemocratic regions in the world.
Theories of power-sharing and recent studies have indicated that institutions that allow for higher levels
of power-sharing are often more successful at consolidating democracy and stability in highly divided
societies, like those common in Sub-Saharan Africa. By examining the electoral system, executive type,
and level of decentralization, this study first determines the level of institutional power-sharing for each of
the 48 Sub-Saharan states. Next, it compares these levels of power-sharing to indicators of democracy
and state stability to determine if more power-sharing does correspond to greater democracy and
stability. Using a bivariate analysis and factoring in region, the data shows that there is a strong and
significant correlation between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and higher levels of democracy
and state stability in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY: POWER-SHARING IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Michael Burgess
Abstract:

Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most politically unstable and undemocratic regions in the
world. Theories of power-sharing and recent studies have indicated that institutions that allow for higher
levels of power-sharing are often more successful at consolidating democracy and stability in highly
divided societies, like those common in Sub-Saharan Africa. By examining the electoral system, executive
type, and level of decentralization, this study first determines the level of institutional power-sharing for
each of the 48 Sub-Saharan states. Next, it compares these levels of power-sharing to indicators of
democracy and state stability to determine if more power-sharing does correspond to greater democracy
and stability. Using a bivariate analysis and factoring in region, the data shows that there is a strong and
significant correlation between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and higher levels of democracy
and state stability in Sub-Saharan Africa.
INTRODUCTION
The Sub-Saharan region of Africa is arguably one of the most divided and conflict-prone
regions in the world. The region is home to more than a thousand languages, and in the past
twenty years most Sub-Saharan countries have experienced violence ranging from ethnic
rebellions to genocide.! The chronic instability and deep cleavages of the states in this region
present comparative political scientists and institution crafters with a unique challenge: how to
implement a democratic system that is truly representative and stable. This challenge is
heightened by the question of how to set up a system that is not susceptible to failure and gives
all parties involved an incentive to see it succeed. Power-sharing, it is theorized, can provide
solutions to both of these problems. The ability for power-sharing institutions to include all
major parties in the decision-making process would appear to make them ideal candidates for
alleviating the tensions that exist between competing groups in Sub-Saharan states. For the
aforementioned reasons, power-sharing institutions are considered especially relevant not just
to the divided societies of Africa, but those across the globe.
Sub-Saharan Africa provides a hard test for determining how effective power-sharing
institutions can be in states that are often extremely divided and have experienced violence
relatively recently. Disputed elections have produced violence, and tension between ethnic
groups has often resulted in conflict, exemplified most shockingly by Rwanda. The resurgence
of violence is often a concern to both policy makers within these states and the international
community, as violence in one state can destabilize the surrounding region. Successful power
sharing is theorized to prevent the outbreak of violence by bringing all major stakeholders to
the table. Evidence of this can be found in Burundi, where in 2009 the last rebel group, the
National Liberation Forces, laid down their arms and were recognized as a legal political party.2

1

Oppong 2006; Global Report 2009.

2 Freedom House 2010: Burundi.
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Such instances seem to provide evidence that power-sharing can promote peace and
successfully integrate opposing groups into the political process. However, power-sharing is
not without its critics. The formal recognition of ethnic or linguistic groups may only serve to
institutionalize differences and exacerbate existing tensions. Granting groups considerable
levels of autonomy may only serve to weaken the state, as it can potentially lead to secession as
in the case of Southern Sudan. Because of the controversial nature of power-sharing institutions,
both its proponents and critics must be considered.
This study will approach the topic of power-sharing first by taking a step back to
consider the arguments and evidence of supporters and detractors of power-sharing
institutions. The purpose of this study is not to consider why states adopt power-sharing
institutions. Instead, it is to examine whether those Sub-Saharan states that have adopted
institutions allowing for higher levels of power-sharing have experienced higher levels of
democracy and stability. This study seeks to answer that question by comparing the
institutional levels of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan states to their measured levels of
democracy and stability. While power-sharing institutions are often cited as solutions for
mitigating conflict and consolidating democracy in cleaved states, surprisingly enough, their
influence as yet has not been tested in Sub-Saharan Africa.
THE CASES FOR AND AGAINST POWER-SHARING
The importance of determining whether or not power-sharing institutions improve
democracy and reduce conflict cannot be overstated. Establishing systematic evidence to
evaluate the impact of power-sharing institutions is both theoretically and politically important
for determining if these arrangements promote long-term peace, manage conflict, and
consolidate democracy in ethnically divided societies. There exists an extensive literature
dedicated to these very issues, which has been developed over the past several decades. This
paper draws substantially from the seminal work by Pippa Norris in 2008 in which the theories
of power-sharing are tested in a large number of cases across the globe. These power-sharing
regimes are characterized by formal institutional rules that give multiple political elites a stake
in the decision making process.3 Power-sharing constitutions share common characteristics that
include the following: executive power-sharing among a grand coalition of political leaders
drawn from all significant groups, proportional representation of major groups in elected and
appointed offices, and cultural autonomy for groups.
It is argued that in post-conflict or ethnically cleaved states the only viable types of
settlements capable of attracting agreement from all factions are power-sharing regimes that
avoid winner-takes-all electoral outcomes. The more inclusive these power-sharing
arrangements are the more likely they will develop stronger support from stakeholders and
therefore ensure stability. While other methods of resolving conflict in ethnically divided
societies have been attempted in the past, such as partition, these are often costly and end in

3 Norris 2008, 22.
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failure.4 Street indicates that power-sharing addresses the key issues that have caused ethnic
tension and hostility, and thus is ideal as a remedy to such problems. Institutions that allow for
the horizontal and vertical dispersal of power are most relevant to heterogeneous societies that
have a history of conflict and are in the process of democratizing. In Africa there is a tendency
for elites to concentrate power at the center and use repressive means as a way of asserting
controLS Avoiding such circumstances is necessary if there is to be any substantial consolidation
of democracy. The use of power-sharing in these segmented societies guarantees all significant
stakeholders a place in the national or regional governments and provides a strong incentive
for politicians to accept the legitimacy of the rules of game, moderate their views, and
collaborate with rivals. Norris suggests that power-sharing institutions also encourage support
for democracy by avoiding winner-take-all elections and guaranteeing minorities a voice in the
government. With assurances that they will not be excluded from government, minorities are
also less likely to take actions that might undermine the stability of the state.
While power-sharing institutions are often cited as being the best option for highly
divided societies, there are still those who challenge the claims that power-sharing institutions
are best for promoting democracy and mitigating conflict. Power-sharing regimes may in fact
serve to institutionalize ethnic cleavages and deepen rather than alleviate them. Explicitly
recognizing the rights of ethnic groups can make it more difficult to generate cross-cutting
cooperation in society by reducing electoral incentive for compromise. The formal recognition
of ethnic or linguistic groups may magnify the political importance of these identities. Solutions
to ethnic conflict that take pre-democratic factions as fixed and grant each group rights and
autonomy may in fact reinforce sub-national identities. By de-emphasizing such identities it
may be possible to turn citizens towards a concept of society that is more inclusive and tolerant
of other groupS.6
In addition to reinforcing societal divisions, Spears argues that power-sharing
institutions lead to a surprisingly unstable form of government that at best only provides a
short reprieve from violent conflicU Power-sharing arrangements are difficult to achieve and
even more difficult to put into practice, and do not stand the test of time or resolve conflict. At
the same time power-sharing regimes in post-conflict societies have an extremely difficult task
ahead of them; they must bridge the cleavages of groups in conflict.s Power-sharing is not about
forming a grand coalition of friends, but reconciling groups that are enemies. Including warring
parties and excluding moderates can have negative consequences for divided societies using
power-sharing.9 Using Rwanda as an example, Spears suggests that it is as difficult to forge an
alliance with a member of the opposition as it is to form an alliance with someone who is

4 Street 2004.
Bratton and Rothchild 1992.
Norris 2008, 28.
7 Spears 2002.
8 Ibid.
9 Jarstad 2006.

5
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considered a murderer. For many of these ethnically divided or post-conflict societies, power
sharing can be equated to making a deal with the devil and is therefore unlikely to last.
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM: PR OR MAJORITARIAN?
Of the factors considered in this study, the type of electoral system a state institutes is
arguably the most important. Electoral system design is a crucial variable in democratic stability
because it provides the means by which political parties or minorities are either included in or
excluded from government. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems typically employ
open or closed party lists or the use of a single transferable vote. In a study of several Sub
Saharan states, Reynolds finds that those states using proportional representation were more
successful and stable democracies.lo Lijphart (2004) notes that the type of electoral system is
crucial because it is significantly related to the development of the party system, type of
executive, and the relationship between the legislature and the executive. ll States using
plurality methods are more likely to have a two-party system and a one party state with a more
dominant executive. PR, on the other hand, is likely to be associated with a multi-party state,
coalitions, and a more equal legislative-executive relationship. These characteristics define the
consensus model of democracy that relies on separation, instead of concentration of power.12
The former two characteristics are significant for the representation of a diverse number of
groups in divided societies, while the later prevents an executive take over. Like Reynolds,
Norris also finds that states making use of PR are more successful at democratic consolidation,
as opposed to those using majority or plurality electoral rules.13
However, proportional representation has several shortcomings, often cited by its critics.
To begin with, the low voting thresholds that are characteristic in many proportional
representation electoral systems give small minority group representatives little incentive to
appeal to people outside their own ethnic group, while moderate political leaders may be
branded as traitors for attempting to appeal to a wider base. Proportional representation also
may serve to institutionalize and reinforce ethnic tensions in society by failing to provide
political leaders with incentives for cross-group cooperation. As Lardeyret (1991) argues, PR
systems are inherently more unstable since coalition governments cannot cope with serious
disagreements. This leads to instability as the executive is left vacant and time is needed to
construct a new coalition and government. These small minority parties tend to wield an undue
amount of power as they are often the swing votes in coalitions.PR's tendency to allow even
extremist parties into government is also problematic as they often are anti-state. Lardeyret's
most important criticism is that PR is the worst system to adopt for ethnically divided states in
Africa.14 Elections often degenerate into a competition between ethnic groups over public office

10 Reynolds 2009.
11

Lijphart 2004.

12 Lijphart 2006; 1999; Norris 2004.
13 Norris 2008, 130.
14 Lardeyret 1991.
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and the best way to counteract this is to encourage members of each group to run against one
another on trans-ethnic issues in single member districts.
Majoritarian electoral systems, in contrast to PR, are characterized by the use of either a
majority or plurality system. Majority systems usually employ a second ballot, while plurality
systems typically use a first-past-the-post method and both types of systems also make use of
single member districts (SMD). These majoritarian systems are thought to encourage bridging
strategies and force political leaders to appeal to a wider base of voters. It is theorized that more
moderate electoral appeals should therefore foster social tolerance and cooperation. Parties
must combine the differing interests of as many voters as possible and offer their electors a
coherent program that they will govern by. A moderation of parties also comes from this, as
most of the votes parties receive are from undecided voters in the middle.15 As Barkan suggests,
in agrarian societies - common in Sub-Saharan Africa - PR often does not produce electoral
results that are much more inclusive than majoritarian systems with SMD.16 In addition,
majoritarian systems make elected members directly responsible to constituent concerns and
provide each district with a representative at the national level.17 Conversely, PR tends to
weaken the links between voter and representative as each region has no definitive
representative. This in turn reduces the prospects for long-term democratic consolidation.18
Majoritarianism, like PR, has a number of shortcomings. Critics of majoritarian systems
argue that winner-takes-all elections often fail to produce stability in post-conflict or divided
societies19. According to Lijphart, in ethnically divided societies "majority rule spells majority
dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy."2o Majoritarian regimes often fail to
incorporate minorities into the government and encourage excluded groups to resort to
alternative methods to express their demands. These can range from violent protests to civil
war, and even state failure. Majoritarian systems are also capable of producing vagaries, such as
the exclusion of substantially supported third parties and a parliamentary majority being won
with fewer total votes than the opposition. Established democracies may be able to tolerate such
representational anomalies, but these could prove catastrophic for fledgling African
democracies.21
PRESIDENTS AND PARLIAMENTS
The concept of a parliamentary executive, or using the legislature as a source for the
executive, lends itself well to power-sharing and is advantageous for a number of reasons. The
prime minister and cabinet can only continue to hold power so long as they have the support of
the majority of the legislature. There is then a stronger incentive for the executive and
15 Lardeyret 1991.
16

Barkan 1995.

17 Norris 2004.
18 Barkan

1998.

19 Binningsbo 2006.
20 Norris 2008, 25.
21 Reynolds 1995; 1999.
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legislature to collaborate, which increases inter-electoral flexibility and acts as a safeguard
against unpopular prime ministers.22 Prime ministers also tend to lead more collegial cabinets,
as opposed to the hierarchical cabinets found in presidential systems. This creates more
collective accountability, as the ministers must present a united agenda. Overall, parliamentary
executives offer more forms of accountability and come closest to exemplifying power-sharing.
Opposed to a parliamentary system, the decision to use a presidential system poses
several risks. To begin with, both the president and the legislature have a rival source of power,
the people, which can make it difficult to resolve deadlocks and disputes.23 The fixed term
lengths of a presidential system are less flexible, whereas an unpopular prime minister can be
much more easily removed from power and replaced without destabilizing the entire
government. Presidential executives can also be a slippery slope for fledgling democracies in
Sub-Saharan Africa, which have led to authoritarianism in the past.24 Additionally, presidential
systems are more unstable and thus more susceptible to regime collapse, while the winner
takes-all outcomes of presidential elections simultaneously raise the stakes and make it less
likely that the loser will accept the outcome. To add to this, the combination of the roles of both
the head of state and head of government reduces the checks and balances on the executive.25
Presidential systems also lack in representativeness and legitimacy, both of which are crucial to
democracy.
Presidential systems are often criticized and seldom defended. However, Shugart and
Carey offer four areas in which presidential systems are superior to parliamentary systems.
These areas are accountability, identifiability, mutual checks, and an arbiter.26 Presidential
systems are superior when it comes to the principle of maximizing direct accountability
between voters and elected officials. Presidents, being directly elected by voters, cannot be
removed due to shifting coalitions or unpopularity in the assembly. Voters can also more easily
identify who they are voting for in a presidential race. Under parliamentary systems, especially
those using PR, voting on party lists might be the only way voters can influence the executive.
The mutual checks created by presidential systems also ensure that the executive can check the
legislature and vice versa. In parliamentary systems the executive is not in a position to resist or
check assembly initiative.27 Finally, the distance between the president and the assembly means
the president cannot threaten the legislature by declaring a measure before the assembly a vote
of confidence. Instead, a president can act as an arbiter or moderator of disputes to secure
legislative agreement.

22

Norris 2008, 141.

23 Ibid., 132.
24 Shugart and Carey 1992.
25 Lijphart 2008.
26 Shugart and Carey 1992.
27 Ibid.
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FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION

The choice of electoral system and executive type influences the horizontal checks and
balances of power in the central institutions of the state. On the other hand, decentralization
determines vertical power-sharing among multiple layers of the government. Political, fiscal,
and administrative decentralization are arguably constitutional solutions to help mitigate
conflict, consolidate peace, and protect minority communities.28 Decentralized governance has
several advantages. First, it generates more democratic participation, representation, and
accountability. Democratically elected local and regional bodies give voters more opportunities
to participate in the democratic process increasing the accountability and responsiveness of
local officials. Next, fiscal decentralization reduces corruption by increasing the transparency
and accountability of elected officials. This point should be noted in regards to Sub-Sahara
Africa, as many of the states in the region are some of the most corrupt in the world. Another
advantage is the strengthening of public policy by allowing local governments to create and
implement region specific policies. This is an important point for Sub-Saharan states, as the
large size and diversity of the groups and regions within these states likely leads to issues
pertinent to only a particular constituency. The flexibility of decentralization is also typically
associated with better administrative efficiency in regards to public services and regulations, as
these are molded to fit each community. The advantages of decentralization are of great
relevance to highly divided societies, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, because they can
assist in accommodating multiple interests. While there are many different ways to achieve
decentralization, a study conducted by Nicholas Charron found that accomodationist forms of
vertical power-sharing, such as ethno-federalism, outperform integrationist forms of vertical
power-sharing in heterogeneous societies, in regards to quality of government.29 This suggests
that accommodating interests, as theories of power-sharing argue, is more successful.
It is worth noting that with regards to plural societies, common in Sub-Sahara Africa
and defined as states that contain multiple groups identified by ethnicity, religion, language,
and a multitude of other characteristics, federalism and decentralization are important
strategies for protecting the interests of spatially concentrated groups, especially if the
administrative boundaries reflect the distribution of these groups. As Norris and Lijphart
indicate, if the boundaries of sub-national governments are based on real social boundaries, the
plural communities within these boundaries can become homogeneous within their region and
thereby reduce communal violence and accommodate a multitude of interests within a single
state.3° Even in plural societies where ethnic groups are dispersed, decentralization can be used
to facilitate the representation of local minorities. Locally elected officials and local decision
making can assist in managing conflict by including leaders drawn from minorities and manage
sensitive cultural or educational matters. Decentralization as a means of power-sharing allows
the diverse groups within plural societies to protect their rights and defend their interests.
28 Norris 2008, 157.
29 Charron 2009.
30 Norris 2008, 162; Lijphart 1999.
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While the case for decentralization is strong, critics often charge that decentralized
governance is overly complex and leads to slow response times. By adding another layer of
government bureaucracy, decentralization may increase costs, decrease efficiency, and result in
poor services.31 The proponents of centralized governance argue centralization enhances
integration, leads to more decisive action, and is more cost effective. The claim that
decentralization increases representation and accountability has also met criticism. With
numerous levels of government it may be unclear as to who to appeal to, and the
responsibilities of representatives at different levels may overlap. The existence of multiple
levels of government can also lead to the rise in regional parties, which in turn may fragment
the party system at the national level. Decentralized governance also increases the possibility of
clientelistic relationships forming between politicians and private citizens. Under such
circumstances corruption may actually expand, not contract. The persistent conflict in Nigeria
and Sudan indicates that federalism has had a less than perfect record in Africa. There are
critics, as Norris indicates, that argue when multiethnic communities are intermingled,
territorial autonomy is ineffective at managing conflict.32 The creation of sub-national structures
may break up the state, while increased demands for autonomy may lead to conflict and even
secession. In decentralized states where boundaries are drawn along ethnic lines it may lead to
the rise in ethnically based parties or encourage politicians to use the I ethnic card' as a means of
attracting votes. This reinforces ethnic identities, generates competition and conflict among
groups, and destabilizes democratic institutions.33 Institutional arrangements that facilitate
territorial autonomy may also provide ethnic leaders with access to the media and legislature
where they can promote an agenda of intolerance and discrimination.
TO SHARE OR NOT TO SHARE?
Substantial evidence exists for both supporting or decrying power-sharing. Since power
sharing draws on both electoral and federal institutions as well as a system's executive
structure, it is unlikely that there will soon be a consensus on the effects of power-sharing.
Either power-sharing institutions do as theorized or they are flawed, but this question must not
be understudied. Previous studies have either drawn on a broader sample or an altogether
different part of the world. With supporters of power-sharing designating it a source of
democracy and peace, the obvious place it needs to be tested is where democracy and peace are
often absent: Sub-Saharan Africa. With the preceding literature in mind and the focus on Sub
Saharan Africa, this leads to two hypotheses.

31 Prudhomme 1995.
32 Norris 2008, 164.
33 Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999.
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These two hypotheses suggest that power-sharing institutions do provide more democracy and
stability, and this study attempts to either support or disprove them.
Hl:

Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater levels of democracy.

H2:

Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater state instability.
RESEARCH DESIGN

Sub-Saharan African is a region where attempts at democratic rule have resulted in
mixed success. The states within this region have implemented a variety of institutions, some
with greater degrees of power-sharing than others. The wide variety of cases in Sub-Saharan
Africa allows for the examination of levels of democracy and state stability from cases with
relatively little or no power-sharing, to those states with relatively high levels of power-sharing.
This study will use a most similar case design for the Sub-Saharan region. Using this design is
intuitive because it will determine whether power-sharing can explain the increased presence of
democracy and stability. Since the study is examining only Sub-Saharan Africa there are a
number of variables that need to be controlled. These factors include low levels of development,
recent transitions to democracy, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, and former colonization.
In order to study the effects of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study will
examine all 48 states that comprise this region, according to the State Department's Bureau of
African Affairs.34 The institutions and measures of democracy and stability will only be
examined as to where they stand as of 2010. While studying the changes in democracy and
stability over a period of time would be insightful, this study does not attempt to accomplish
this due to the relatively fluid and dynamic nature of political institutions in Africa.
Determining a time frame in which a majority of the Sub-Saharan states' political institutions
remained stable would be near impossible. To assess the relationship between the variables, a
bivariate analysis will be used to determine correlation between three variables: Power-Sharing
Index Score, Freedom House Score, and Failed States Index Score.
The four sub-regions of Sub-Saharan Africa - Eastern, Central, Western, and Southern
will also be included as control variables. The regions are defined using the UN's definitions of
regions with three exceptions. First, Sudan is considered part of Sub-Saharan Africa, yet under
the UN's classification is part of Northern Africa. For this study Sudan is grouped with Eastern
Africa because of its location and proximity to other East African states. The next two
exceptions are Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Both of these states are defined as being part of
Eastern Africa. However, upon further review and consultation these states were included as
part of Southern Africa. This is due to their geographic location and because without these two
cases Southern Africa would have been comprised of a mere five states.

34 See appendix for full list of states and their scores.
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

The independent variable in this study is institutional power-sharing. It is measured by the
extent to which the formal institutions of a country allow for the inclusion of all major political
actors in the decision making process. In determining the levels of institutional power-sharing, I
will look at the three major institutions related to power-sharing: the electoral system, type of
executive, and state decentralization. Decentralization in this study refers to political,
administrative, and fiscal decentralization. These three institutions are the most critical to
power-sharing and ensuring the consolidation of democracy.
Those states that use PR, a parliamentary executive, and federalism have higher levels of
power-sharing. States that utilize a majoritarian electoral system, presidential executive, and are
highly centralized constitute systems, that according to the literature, allow for very little
power-sharing. To quantify levels of power-sharing I have developed a 10 point index ranging
from 0-9 that rates countries levels of power-sharing based on the aforementioned factors of
electoral system type, executive type, and degree of decentralization. All three factors will be
based on a 4-point scale, from 0-3, with higher scores indicating more power-sharing.
For the electoral system the scale goes as follows: Proportional representation = 3pts;
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) = 2pts; SMD or Plurality = 1 pt; appointed legislature or
non-existence of the national legislature = Opts. For the electoral system variable, only the type
of electoral system used for the lower house is considered in this index. The use of PR is
associated with higher levels of power-sharing due to the low barriers it presents to parties
trying to gain representation in the legislature. Such low barriers allow a multitude of parties to
attain seats in the national legislature. MMP is a compromise in that it is neither PR nor
majoritarian, but represents a middle ground between the two. While not as inclusive as PR, it
is a step above majoritarian systems in terms of power-sharing. The problem with MMP is that
often the threshold for the PR part of the system is as high as 5% or more. This means that
groups dispersed throughout the country may not be able to attain representation. Majoritarian
systems using SMD are seen as the least conducive to power-sharing as it is often much more
difficult for minor parties to gain representation. The United States and United Kingdom are
commonly cited examples of how such systems often lead to either a two party state or a one
party system. There are cases in which the national legislature is either wholly appointed or
non-existent. As this runs contrary to the purpose of power-sharing, which is to promote
democracy, such institutions are regarded as allowing no degree of power-sharing.
The next institution considered is the executive branch, coded as follows: Parliamentary
system= 3pts; Semi-Presidential= 2pts; Presidential= lpt; appointed executive or monarchy
=Opts. A parliamentary executive is associated with higher levels of power-sharing because the
executive is often drawn from a coalition of parties that make up the majority in the lower
house. Parliamentary systems also allow for the changing of the executive in a much more
stable manner without the need for another national election. Systems that divide executive
power, typically between a president and prime minister, are referred to as semi-presidential.
While such systems do allow for the election of a prime minister and president these two
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officials typically come from the same party. Semi-presidentialism can also be dangerous if the
prime minister and president are from different political parties as this can result in executive
deadlock and competition for power. Established democracies like France might be able to
survive these situations, but in less stable states this could be a catalyst for conflict. Presidential
systems invest all executive power into a single person and in addition to being less
representative, elections to this position can be seen as a zero-sum game in highly divided
societies. This gives the losing parties less incentive to accept defeat, as recent elections in
Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire have shown. The appointment of the executive, such as by an
occupying force, or a monarchy like Swaziland represent an executive in which no power
sharing can take place as the institution is utterly undemocratic. It should be noted that in this
index those countries that have a president and prime minister are only considered semi
presidential or parliamentary if the prime minister is chosen from the lower house or directly
elected. If the president appoints the prime minister as part of his cabinet the system is
considered presidential because the president is still effectively considered the head of state and
head of government.
The final factor, decentralization, can be broken down into three categories and goes as
follows: Federations = 3pts; Decentralized Unions = 2pts; Unitary States = 1pt. 35 States with no
central government or little to no control over territory =Opts. Federal institutions create another
level of democratic representation in which minor or local parties can gain representation. This
additional level of government also grants a degree of autonomy to these locales and allows
them manage local affairs. Decentralized hybrids, similar to Tanzania, have devolved powers
down to local levels of government and represent a step in the right direction in terms of
power-sharing. However in these systems nearly all important decision making and real power
still rests with the central government, especially in fiscal matters. A majority of Sub-Saharan
states represent a highly centralized unitary structure. Under such systems, there is little, if any,
devolution of power and nearly all decisions come from the central authority. If a state is failed,
like Somalia, any form of devolution of powers is impossible. The state cannot even consider
local or regional issues, let alone address them. With no place for representation from the local
to national level, it is impossible for groups to share power.36
Not all states will fit perfectly within these definitions. Even two states that are
presidential republics may have nuanced differences that set them apart. Levels of
centralization and electoral systems can be especially complicated. States are often simply
identified as federal or unitary.37 For others though decentralization may be viewed as much
more subtle process that involves incremental steps.38 The study of electoral systems usually
involves identifying the rules of the system in place. For example, it is often important to
distinguish between open and closed list PR. The inability of the index to include such detail is
a limitation. However, nearly all state institutions can be classified under one of the three subNorris 2008, 173.
See Appendix for Power-sharing Index (PSI) Table.
3? Lijphart 1999.
3 8 Norris 2008, 170.
35

36
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categories. The index considers the most relevant institutions and system types, which allows it
to accurately rank states based on their levels of institutional power-sharing.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The first dependent variable is democracy. Democracy will be measured using the
composite score of a country on the Freedom House Liberal Democracy Index. Freedom House
uses the Gastil Index, a 7-point scale for measuring political rights and civil liberties. While
other measures of democracy were considered, Freedom House was the only one with scores
for the year 2010. Changes in a states' ranking are also explained along with any relevant
political changes that took place. The index also does not favor any particular type of
democratic institution. In other words, by default it does not consider a parliamentary executive
any more democratic than a presidential executive.
Freedom House, an independent think tank based in the United States began assessing
political trends in the 1950s. In 1972 it switched to the Gastil Index which assigns ratings of the
political rights and civil liberties for each state and then categorizes them as free, partially free,
or not free. The index tracks the existence of political rights by looking at the electoral processes,
political pluralism, and the functioning of government. Civil liberties are measured in terms of
the existence of freedom of speech and association, rule of law, and personal rights. The
classifications are based on a checklist of questions, which includes ten separate items that relate
to the existence of political rights and fifteen items concerning civil liberties. These items assess
the institutional checks and balances of power on the executive by the legislature, an
independent judiciary, and the existence of political rights and civil liberties. These also include
self-determination and participation by minorities, and free and fair elections laws. Each item is
given a score from 0-4 and all are equal when combined. The raw scores of a country are then
converted into a 7-point scale of political rights and a 7-point scale of civil liberties. These two
scores are then combined to determine the average rating of a state and whether it is free, partly
free, or not free.39
Although it provides scores for nearly all states and independent territories as well as
being a long running time-series of observations, there are several flaws and biases. First the
process used by Freedom House suffers from lack of transparency, so it is impossible to check
the reliability and consistency of coding decisions. The items used to measure political rights
and civil liberties also cover a wide range of issues, some of which might not necessarily be
indicative of democracy. Since no breakdown of the composite scores is made available it is
impossible to test which of the items correlate most with democracy. While it is biased in the
sense that it measures only liberal democracy, it is widely used and trusted as providing an
accurate representation of a states' level of democracy.4o
The second dependent variable is state stability. To measure this I utilized the Failed
States Index from ForeignPolicy.com and the Fund for Peace. The Failed State Index defines a
39 Freedom House.
40 Norris 2008; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; See Appendix for Freedom House Scores.
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state as failing when it loses physical control over its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force. The erosion of legitimate authority, inability to provide public services, and
inability interact with other states are also characteristics. The index includes 177 states and the
Fund for Peace uses the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), an original methodology
developed over the past decade. The CAST model employs a four step trend-line analysis, (1)
consisting of rating twelve social, economic, political, and military indicators; (2) assessing the
capabilities of five core state institutions considered essential for sustaining security; (3)
identifying idiosyncratic variables or factors; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map that
shows the conflict history of the states being analyzed. The twelve indicators used are:
Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven
Development, Economic Decline, Delegitimization of the State, Public Services, Human Rights,
Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention.41
The ranking a state receives is based on the total combined scores of these twelve
indicators. Each indicator is measured on a scale from 0-10, with zero being the most stable and
ten being the most unstable. These indicators are then combined to form a scale from 0-120 in
which higher scores indicate more instability. The CAST methodology has been peer-reviewed
over the past decade by independent scholars, educational, government, and private
institutions (Fund for Peace). Since the ratings are meant to measure the vulnerability of a state
they cannot predict when a state might collapse or experience violence. Although the trend lines
that these scores produce may be used as a means of determining the future direction of a state.
Unfortunately the raw data used in creating these rankings is not readily available due to it
being drawn from millions of news articles and reports. However the index values are readily
available to the public.42
REGION
Region is factored in due to the potential effects it may have on stability and democracy.
As has happened before in Africa, a result of civil war is often human flight. A massive influx of
refugees can place a great strain on the recipient country. The violence that drove these refugees
might not only follow them, but their sudden presence in a foreign state has the possibility of
inciting a xenophobic backlash among the native population. Another dangerous possibility is
the chance rebel groups may use neighboring states as a launching point for attacks. Regional
conflict has the potential to destabilize all surrounding states and maintaining stability is
undoubtedly easier if neighboring states are not imploding due to civil war. Region is also
important when considering democracy because of the idea of regional diffusion. In other
words, democracy in one state has the potential to influence and spread to surrounding states.
The ideas and institutions adopted by one state can impact those of another. If all states within a
particular region had adopted democratic institutions, while states outside of this region had
failed to do so, one could conclude that regional factors played a role in spreading democracy.
41 Foreign Policy.
42 See Appendix for Failed States Index Scores.
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DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

As the data test the two competing bodies of literature on power-sharing institutions
and the possible effects of region, there are several expected outcomes. If the data support the
hypotheses that those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing have higher levels
of democracy and stability, then there should be a positive correlation between the Power
Sharing Index Score (PSI) and Freedom House Score (FH). There should also be a negative
relationship between the PSI Score and Failed States Index Score (FSI). If the data do not
support the hypotheses, the opposite will be seen in the results. A third outcome in this case is
possible. The results may support none of the stated hypotheses and there simply might not be
a significant relationship in either direction. This would truly be disappointing as it would
imply that no set of institutions is likely to be any more effective in Sub-Saharan Africa.
If region does have any significant affect on democracy and stability we should see this
in the form of significant positive correlations between the individual regions and FH Scores
and FSI Scores. The absence of such significant correlations means we can rule out region as
have any meaningful impact on a state's measured level of democracy or stability. However, the
presence of any significant findings would indicate that there are regional factors that are
influencing how stable and democratic a state is. The number of cases used in this study, 48,
while relatively large for a comparative study, also means each individual case can have a
larger effect on the overall results. While this small number may justify the use of a ninety
percent confidence level, statistical significance will only be given to results achieving a ninety
five percent confidence leveL
Table 1 shows the results of the bivariate correlation between the FSI Score, PSI Score,
FH Score, and region. The first notable result can be seen in the strength and significance of the
correlation between democracy and stability. While this association may seem obvious, it
indicates that these two characteristics are not simply two random and unrelated concepts.
Instead, it points to the fact that these are two characteristics of a state that are strongly
associated with each other. Since power-sharing institutions are theorized to improve these two
aspects of a state, it is crucial they actually be related. The next significant result is the strong
correlation between institutional power-sharing and democracy. This indicates that those states
with higher levels of institutional power-sharing also have correspondingly higher levels of
democracy. This supports the hypothesis that a higher level of institutional power-sharing is
associated with more democracy. The correlation between power-sharing and stability also
turns out to be significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence and moderately strong.
The negative correlation is expected here as it shows that higher levels of power-sharing
correlate negatively with instability. This supports the second hypothesis that higher levels of
institutional power-sharing will be associated with more stability. As we see with these results,
region has no significant relationship to either of the dependent variables. Thus the findings
exclude region as being strongly associated with stability or democratization.
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Table 1: Correlation between power-sharing (PSI), stability (FSI), democracy (FH) and Region
Dependent Variables: FSI Score and FH Score
FH Score FSI Score PSI Score
Western
Central
Eastern
FH Score

FSI Score

.703**
(.000)

PSI Score

.455**
(.001)

-.318*
(.028)

Eastern

-.114
(.438)

.028
(.852)

-.233
(.111)

Western

.167
(.257)

-.011
(.939)

.117
(.427)

.574**
(.000)

Central

-.255
(.080)

.181
(.218)

-.090
(.545)

.316*
(.029)

.331*
(.021)

Southern

.196
(.182)

-.213
(.147)

.247
(.091)

.292*
(.044)

.306*
(.034)

.185
(.209)

48

48

48

48

48

48

N
**p<O.Ol, *p<0.05

The other significant findings reveal that the regions correlate with each other, in all but
one instance, because they all share the similar characteristics of high instability and lower
levels of democracy. The one instance in which the regions do not correlate with each other is in
the case of Central and Southern Africa. This is most likely because Southern Africa is arguably
the most stable and democratic region of Sub-Saharan Africa, while Central Africa is the worst
in these regards. 43
CONCLUSIONS
Theories of power-sharing suggest that institutions that allow for the inclusion of all
major actors will produce more democracy and greater stability. These consociational systems
have been studied extensively over the past several decades by scholars such as Norris and

43 If Zimbabwe and Mozambique are grouped in with Eastern Africa the results of the correlation differ greatly for

Southern Africa and alter the conclusions that can be drawn. When this is done, Southern Africa has a correlation
with stability of -.319 that is significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence. This is almost exactly the same
strength of the correlation between power-sharing and stability. This indicates that the stability of a region plays a
role in state stability. The relationship between democracy and Southern Africa also improves to .261 with a
significance of .073. The correlation with power-sharing also increases to .277 with a significance of .056. What these
alternate results point towards is that Southern Africa has adopted institutions with more power-sharing. In doing so
the result has been higher levels of democracy and stability.

114

RES PUBLICA

Lipjhart, producing a debate about their effects. This study has attempted to contribute to that
debate by testing the relationship between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and
democracy and conflict in the tumultuous region of Sub-Saharan Africa. The results show that
those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing are associated with greater
democracy and stability. While these findings by no means conclude the debate, the results
clearly support proponents of power-sharing. There has been very little work done to study the
effects of power-sharing institutions of Sub-Saharan Africa. The theoretical literature predicts
two sets of competing hypotheses on the expected outcomes of increased power-sharing.
However, previous studies have not focused on the part of the world where these institutions
may be needed most. This study takes the first step in determining whether or not power
sharing institutions do work Sub-Saharan Africa.
With many African states deeply divided and under duress, studies of this kind can
assist policymakers in determining the correct institutions to implement. Looking to cases to
like South Africa, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, other states can see how power
sharing institutions have assisted in creating free and stable states. This study should not be
viewed as the final word on power-sharing institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Examples exist
within Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Ethiopia and Niger, where states have moved to institutions
allowing for greater degrees of power-sharing and yet their levels of democracy and stability
remain dangerously low. It is important for scholars to continue studying the precise reasons as
to why power-sharing has been more effective in some states than others.
The aforementioned cases of failure point towards factors affecting power-sharing not
covered in this study. It is possible that corruption or lack of funds has prevented such
institutions from functioning as they are theoretically designed to function. The literature also
makes an important distinction between those states that are highly divided or post-conflict.
This difference is important because past conflict can make it more difficult to bring all major
actors to the table, while cleaved societies may simply be seeking a means of fairer
representation. Deeply divided societies with a high degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization
may also affect the duration of such institutions as the possibility of conflict can be greater. As
mentioned in the design section of this study, institutional duration was something that
unfortunately had to be omitted for logistical reasons. However, examining the duration of
power-sharing institutions would go far in disproving the critics that power-sharing institutions
do not last, or vindicate their theories about the fragility of such institutions.
The purpose of this study was not to try and account for every possible factor
influencing the success or failure of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, it was meant
to act as a starting point for future research. To gain a better perspective on what conditions are
conducive to the success of these institutions and what may lead to their failure requires a more
in depth look into the regions and individual cases. In doing so it can also be more fully
understood how power-sharing institutions affect regime change and the formation of political
parties. With that being said it is critical that we determine which set of institutions are most
likely to provide democracy and stability for the states of Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Appendix

List of Sub-Saharan States, Scores, System Type, and Region
Electoral
Svstem

Executive

Decentralization Region

PR

Pres.

Unitary

Central

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Western

68.6

5

Maj.

Par.

Unitary

Southern

4

90.7

6

PR

Semi

Unitary

Western

Burundi

4.5

96.7

5

PR

Pres

Unitary

Eastern

Cameroon

6

95.4

5

Maj.

Semi

Decentralized

Central

Cape Verde

1

77.2

7

PR

Par.

Unitary

Western

CAR

5

106.4

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Central

Chad

6.5

113.3

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Central

Comoros

3.5

85.1

5

Maj.

Pres.

Federal

Eastern

DRC

6

109.9

4

MMP

Pres.

Unitary

Central

RofC

5.5

92.5

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Central

Cote d'Ivoire

5.5

101.2

4

Maj.

Semi

Unitary

Western

Djibouti

5

81.9

4

Maj.

Semi

Unitary

Eastern

Equatorial

7

88.5

5

PR

Pres.

Unitary

Western

Eritrea

7

93.3

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

Ethiopia

5

98.8

7

Maj.

Par.

Federal

Eastern

Gabon

5.5

75.3

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Central

Gambia

5

80.2

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Western

Ghana

1.5

67.1

4

Maj.

Pres.

Decentralized

Western

Country

FH Score

FSI Score

PSI Score

Angola

5.5

83.7

5

Benin

2

76.8

Botswana

2.5

Burkina Faso

Guinea

TTninn

Guinea

6.5

105

4

MMP

Pres.

Unitary

Western

Guinea-Bissau

4

97.2

6

PR

Semi

Unitary

Western

Kenya

4

1 00.7

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

Lesotho

3

82.2

6

MMP

Par.

Unitary

Southern

Liberia

3.5

91.7

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Western

Madagascar

5

82.6

4

Maj.

Semi

Unitary

Eastern

Malawi

3.5

93.6

3

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern
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Country

FH Score

FSI Score

PSI Score

Electoral
System

Executive

Decentralization Region

Mali

2.5

79.3

4

Maj.

Semi

Unitary

Western

Mauritania

5.5

89.1

4

Maj.

Semi

Unitary

Western

Mauritius

2

44.4

5

Maj.

Par.

Unitary

Eastern

Mozambique

3.5

81.7

5

PR

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

Namibia

2

74.5

6

PR

Pres.

Decentralized

Southern

Niger

4.5

97.8

6

PR

Semi

Nigeria

4.5

100.2

5

Maj.

Rwanda

5.5

88.7

5

Sao Tome &

2

75.8

Senegal

3

Seychelles

TTnion

Unitary

Western

Pres.

Federal

Western

PR

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

7

PR

Par.

Unitary

Central

74.6

5

MMP

Semi

Unitary

Western

3

67.9

4

MMP

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

Sierra Leone

3

93.6

5

PR

Pres.

Unitary

Western

Somalia

7

114.3

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

Eastern

South Africa

2

67.9

9

PR

Par.

Federal

Southern

Sudan

7

111.8

4

N/A

Pres.

Federal

Eastern

Swaziland

6

82.8

2

Maj.

N/A

Unitary

Southern

Tanzania

3.5

81.2

4

Maj.

Pres.

Decentralized

Eastern

Principe

Togo

4.5

88.1

5

PR

Pres.

Uganda

4.5

97.5

3

Maj.

Zambia

3.5

83.9

3

Zimbabwe

6

110.2

4

Bnion

Unitary

Western

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

Maj.

Pres.

Unitary

Eastern

Maj.

Semi

Unitary

Eastern

Sub-Saharan States, Freedom House Scores, Failed States Index Scores, System Types, and Region.
Source(s); State Department Bureau of African Affairs; Freedom House 2010; Failed States Index 2010;
CIA World Factbook; UN Definition of Regions; Political Handbook of Africa: 2007. www.state.gov;
www.freedomhouse.org; www.foreignpolicy.com; www.cia.gov; www.un.org.
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Power-sharing Index Table (PSI)
Score

Electoral System

Executive

Decentralization

3

Proportional
Representation

Parliamentary

Federal

2

Mixed Member
Proportional

Semi-Presidential

Decentralized Union

1

Majoritarian
(Plurality/FPTP w /
SMD)
Appointed or nonexistent

Presidential

Unitary

Monarchy or Appointed

Failed State

0

Power-sharing Index (PSI). Source(s) : CIA World Factbook; Political Handbook of Africa: 2007.
www.cia.gov.
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